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AbSTrACT: Historians and sociologists have argued that the practices of confession played a major role in the 
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tantism and Protestant modes of confession, first and foremost the practice of writing spiritual diaries and then read-
ing and rereading them. The article looks at Catholic confessional practices and how they, too, have shaped modern 
notion of subjecthood. Centering on Foucault’s contribution, the article argue that Catholic confession, just like its 
Protestant avatar, paved a route to modernity.
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rESUMEN: El sujeto confesante y la construcción de la individualidad católica moderna.- Tanto historiadores 
como sociólogos han defendido que las prácticas de confesión tuvieron un papel fundamental en el paso hacia una 
individualidad moderna, introspectiva. Sin embargo, hasta la década de los setenta del siglo XX la mayor parte de la 
literatura se centró en el Protestantismo y en los modos de confesión protestante, sobre todo en la práctica de escritu-
ra de diarios espirituales así como su posterior lectura y relectura. Este artículo explora las prácticas de confesión 
católicas y como estas, también, moldearon la noción moderna de subjetividad. Centrándose en la contribución de 
Foucault, el artículo defiende que la confesión Católica, al igual que su avatar protestante, allanó el camino hacia la 
modernidad. 
PAlAbrAS ClAvE: Confesión; Michel Foucault; Confesionalización; Modernidad; Subjetividad; Contar la 
Verdad. 
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MODErNiTY AND rEligiON bEYOND WEbEr
Different sets of binary oppositions have dominated 
much of the twentieth-century’s scholarship on the transi-
tion to modernity. This was due mostly, of course, to the 
immense impact of the German sociologist Max Weber 
and his thesis concerning the affinities between Protes-
tantism and capitalism. As is well known, Weber’s dis-
cussion of modernity presents a “supersessionist” para-
digm that posits--sometimes explicitly but mostly 
implicitly—that a Catholic worldview,  dominated by ir-
rational and magical thinking, communal (non-individu-
al) sources of identity, and mechanical performance of 
ritualistic acts, was replaced in modernity by Protestant-
ism, individualism, capitalist accumulation of wealth, and 
rationality. In modernity, a period whose starting point is, 
roughly speaking, in the second half of the sixteenth cen-
tury, exteriority and performativity were substituted by 
the acquisition of both introspective and abstractive 
modes of thinking and being (Weber, 1930). 
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The notion of ‘modern subjectivity,’ the topic of both 
the current issue of Culture & History and of this article, 
is thus part and parcel of the Weberian paradigm. Put dif-
ferently, Weber’s thesis addressed not merely an econom-
ic development. In addition to creating a new economic 
regime, Protestantism, alleged Weber, had given birth to a 
new form of subjectivity and to new ways of acquiring 
subjectivity. A deeply-felt sense of theo-psychological 
angst, and, as a consequence, a drive to outperform one-
self in a futile effort to calm one’s ceaseless self-question-
ing, according to Weber, created new selves, for whom 
self-doubt and the need to overcome it became the very 
core of one’s identity. In modernity, the self is first and 
foremost a self-interrogating machine; introspection is 
the essence of modern subjecthood.
It goes without saying that the Weberian modern self 
is much more than just introspection and anxiety. It is 
also characterized by a profit-driven activity in the eco-
nomic realm, and a curiosity vis-à-vis the created world, 
and by political rationality. The modern subject practices 
a specific mode of independence and self-possession in 
his actions in the public sphere (and my use of the pro-
noun ‘he’ is not accidental; the characteristics of the We-
berian modern subject make him implicitly male and ex-
clude females from being capable of acquiring modern 
subjectivity).  The Weberian argument further claimed 
that this new individual had not existed (or had been less 
common) prior to Western Protestant modernity. Weaving 
together historical, theological, economic, and psycho-
logical threads, Weber’s paradigm could be viewed as 
one of the most courageous attempts to offer a theoretical 
model of the transition to modernity. Its theoretical model 
of self-realization within prescribed settings influenced, 
among many others, Anthony Giddens and Peter Wagner, 
two of the leading theoreticians of modernity in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century (Giddens, 1984; Wagner, 
1994). 
In the 1970s and ‘80s, however, some historians and 
sociologists have started to challenge the validity of the 
Weberian paradigm or some of its parts. Since then, ques-
tions have been raised as to whether we have ever been 
modern and whether modernity, as it has been theorized 
and used in the social and humanistic sciences, is a Euro-
centric concept whose usefulness has passed (Latour, 
1993; Mitchell, 2000; Chakrabarty, 2007). Feminist 
scholars equally rejected most aspects of the Weberian 
paradigm of the modern subject with the simple but acute 
observation that the major characteristics of the modern 
subject, namely individuality, independence, and the ca-
pacity to act as an agent, are all gendered (Morgan, 1997; 
Bologh, 2009). Finally, Sociologist Shmuel N. Eisenstadt 
and his many followers have argued for the coexistence 
of multiple trajectories of modernities and insisted on the 
conjectural history of Western modernity (Eisenstadt, 
2000). For the purpose of this article, I ignore this im-
mense, varied, and sophisticated body of criticisms lev-
eled by philosophers, sociologists, and historians against 
Weber’s theory. I do not discuss these challenges not be-
cause I disagree with them. On the contrary, for the pur-
pose of this article I ignore them because I find that the 
Weberian paradigm has become so ubiquitous and has 
shaped our thinking to such a degree that there is no es-
caping it. It has supplies all of us (scholars and lay people 
alike) with a generalized notion of modernity that is the 
only basis for any conversation concerning the modern 
world, even—and maybe especially—when the goal of 
the conversation is to dismantle the entire Weberian con-
struct. Simply put, even opposition to the Weberian para-
digm cannot be articulated outside the Weberian language 
and his (alleged or real) sets of affinities among moderni-
ty, individualism, introspection, and religion. A rare ex-
ample of a frontal challenge to the Weberian paradigm 
was launched by German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, 
who argued that the Jesuits’ discovery of absolute obedi-
ence to, and dependence on God for human self-assertion 
participated in the invention of modern subjectivity. In 
what follows, I, too, turn to the Jesuits, but argue, instead, 
that it was their cultivation of the practices of confession 
that should be credited with what Sloterdijk calls modern 
self-stylization (Sloterdijk 2013:57-65). 
ThE CONfESSiNg SUbjECT Of MODErNiTY
Among the numerous challenges to the Weberian par-
adigm since the 1970s and ‘80s, the Catholic practice of 
sacramental auricular confession played a significant role. 
It was by discussing the sense of guilt and the sacrament 
of penance, I suggest, that historians have offered new 
narratives of the transition to modernity and of the inven-
tion of the modern introspective subject, narratives that 
put into question the Weberian affinity between moderni-
ty and Protestantism. In this article, I will discuss three 
late-twentieth-century theories and their contribution to 
new ways of thinking about subjectivity, modernity, and 
religions in early modern Europe. 
The French historian Jean Delumeau and his British 
contemporary John Bossy were the first to revive the in-
terest in penance and confession as historical topics of 
investigation (Delumeau, 1983; 1990; Bossy, 1975). They 
did not challenge Weber directly, but their alternative the-
ory of modernity examined the Catholic Reformation and 
its contribution to the formation of a new subjectivity. As 
such, their historical investigations enable us to see to 
what degree Weber’s paradigm does justice to develop-
ments within the other major branch of early modern 
Christianity, namely Catholicism. The two historians ar-
gued that a slow process, whose origins go back to the 
twelfth century and whose apogee occurred at the Church 
Council of Trent in the middle of the sixteenth century, 
instilled new notions of guilt, shame, and fear in Christian 
souls. Delumeau’s corpus of writings offers the most de-
tailed histories of both confession and the sense of sin 
from the early Middle Ages until the modern age. John 
Bossy’s more concise discussions argue that a process of 
interiorization of a sense of guilt was taking place in the 
later Middle Ages. It led people to understand sin and its 
consequence, namely a sense of guilt, as a personal and 
individual responsibility. High and Late medieval Christi-
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anity slowly but steadily taught the centrality of private 
confession as a precondition for personal salvation. By so 
doing, according to Bossy, this process eroded long-
standing notions of selfhood and guilt that had been com-
munal or community-related. Following their contribu-
tion, there is no denying that a deep sense of personal 
culpability and an on-going process of individualization 
and privatization of the sense of guilt shaped souls in Eu-
rope way before the Protestant Reformation. And as 
Bossy and other have convincingly documented, it was a 
major part of a post-Tridentine Catholic teaching (Tentler, 
1977; Prosperi, 1996; Romeo, 1997) 
A second theoretical challenge has been advanced by 
the promoters of the “Confessionalization Theory.” 
Scholars who adhere to this school, whose leading propo-
nents have been the German historians Wolfgang Rein-
hard and Heinz Schilling, are usually more loyal to the 
Weberian tradition. This makes sense as most of their 
writings have dealt with new forms of authority and sub-
ject-formation in Protestant German territories and politi-
cal entities (Hsia, 1989; Schilling, 1992; 1995; Brady, 
2004). By the term ‘confessionalization,’ scholars refer to 
the collaborative endeavor of state and church in Protes-
tant countries and territories to create new submissive 
subjects. During a long process, stretching from the early 
sixteenth century to the middle years of the following 
century, religious changes, moral reforms, state forma-
tion, and various civilizing processes coalesced. Norbert 
Elias’s celebrated term ‘civilizing process’ usually refers 
to changes in the political sphere. These changes were 
driven by the rising nation-state and its bourgeois agents, 
and led to an imposition of upper-class norms of conduct 
and rationality on members of lower classes (Elias, 2000; 
Mitzman, 1987; Powell, 2013). The term confessionaliza-
tion, as we have already noticed, refers to processes in the 
religious sphere. And yet, the joining together of these 
transformative forces contributed to a wide-ranging and 
all-encompassing enterprise of social control, as well as 
to a major re-formation and manufacturing of modern 
obedient selves. As said, the Confessionalization School 
deals mostly with territories belonging to the Holy Ro-
man Empire, but it has had a direct impact on a compara-
tive study of modes of confessionalization (Reinhard, 
1977; Reinhard and Schilling, 1995). Italian and Italian-
shaped scholarship argued, similarly, that new notions of 
guilt, truth, and subject formation shaped Counter-Refor-
mation Italy (and other Catholic areas) (Di Simplicio, 
1994; Romeo, 1997; De Boer, 2001; Lavenia, 2004). 
The term confessionalization is obviously employed 
by it promoters in this context to indicate adherence to a 
confession, or a creed of a specific faith, rather than as the 
act of verbal admission of sins to another person. The lin-
guistic confusion notwithstanding, I want to emphasize 
that moral reform and surveillance mechanisms, the two 
engines of the confessionalization reform, could not, in 
fact, have taken place without the invention, cultivation, 
and proliferation of forms of investigation of sinful (and 
criminal) behaviors. They also required, or at least en-
couraged, a recognition of sin or criminality by the sin-
ners or criminals. Thus, whereas for Delumeau and 
Bossy, the historians of Catholic confessional practices, 
the implementation of sacramental confession as a man-
datory practice of avowal was a theological and pastoral 
development, for the scholars of the Confessionalization 
School, the process was mostly political, judicial, and so-
cial. And while the two historians of Catholicism high-
lighted the internal process of transformation of selves, 
the confessionalization theorists emphasized external 
techniques and practices of surveillance and control. 
Challenging the validity of the Confessionalization 
Theory for Catholic territories is not my goal in this arti-
cle. It is worth pointing out, though, that Catholic theolo-
gians in the middle years of the sixteenth century, espe-
cially during the Council of Trent, were promoting and 
reaffirming the mandatory nature and salvific potential of 
sacramental confession at the very same time that philos-
ophers and legal scholars in Catholic countries (and be-
yond) were starting to debate the epistemological, legal, 
and psychological validities of confession, and whether 
confession was a reliable tool for reaching truth. These 
doubts would later lead to the undermining of the judicial 
rationales for torture and for the gradual replacement of 
this practice by new means of forensic evidence. Some 
legal scholars had always warned that physical torture 
and emotional fear threatened the credibility of confes-
sion. Now new voices raised doubts, pointing out that 
ventriloquism, mental incapacity, and sheer imbecility, 
too, call into question the reliability of people’s avowals 
of their acts and thoughts. Thus, the promotion of confes-
sion within the Catholic religious sphere coincided with 
an unprecedented questioning of the validity of confes-
sion in secular spheres, and the promotion of external and 
therefore circumstantial evidence as a precondition for a 
guilt-verdict. This process slowly led to the decline, and 
in some cases even dismissal, of the traditional status of 
(secular) confession as the Queen of Proofs (Mandrou, 
1958; Langbein, 1974; Maclean, 1992; Krause, 2015). 
These antithetical processes should warn us against read-
ing an all-encompassing process of subjugation by means 
of truth-telling that allegedly reshaped all spheres of life 
in early modern Europe. 
A third theory of modernity and modern subjectivity 
was developed by the French philosopher Michel Fou-
cault, who, in his writings of the very same years, re-
shaped our notions of the historicity of selfhood, power, 
and knowledge, and of the role of what he named “verid-
iction,” (véridiction) or truth-telling, in all of the above. 
For Foucault, who was familiar with some of Delumeau’s 
writings, confession was the paradigmatic incarnation of 
the nexus power/knowledge in pre-secular Europe (Fou-
cault, 1977: 27; Delumeau, 1983: 10). More than any oth-
er historian of religion or of modernity, he offered the 
most dynamic interpretation of the role of confession in 
the incubation and formation of modernity. Admittedly, 
Foucault developed this connection mostly in his writings 
on late antiquity. But morphologically and contextually, 
the same could be said of early modern Europe. Further-
more, I will argue below that he had early modern Ca-
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tholicism in mind when he presented the cognitive revo-
lutions concerning sinfulness he attributed to late 
antiquity (Foucault, 2000: 135-52; 1997: 199; 2003: 167-
99; 2007; 2012a; 2012b). And as we have already seen, 
that had been the case with Delumeau and Bossy, and 
with the German promoters of the Confessionalization 
Theory, namely that the Catholic practices of confession 
were central to his notions of modernity and of modern 
selfhood. Historians have rushed to point out the degree 
to which Foucault’s “entire discussion of the concept of 
confession lacks sufficient theoretical weight from which 
to establish any coherent position.” This was not a sacri-
legious statement; Foucault himself admitted as much 
(Carrette, 2000: 38; Taylor, 2009). And yet, there is much 
value to his theorization of confession, both in terms of 
its actual content and in light of the fact that his assump-
tions, be they historically and theologically sound or 
shaky, have come to dominate most discussions of con-
fession in Catholic Western culture and in Western mo-
dernity, just as Weber had shaped the discussion before 
him.
Foucault never wrote the fourth and fifth volumes of 
his History of Sexuality that he had intended to discuss 
the development of confession as a critical nexus of pow-
er and knowledge and the way by which subject forma-
tion and subjugation overlapped in the Middle Ages. But 
he has left behind enough lectures and short articles to 
reconstruct his arguments about the role the practice of 
sacramental confession played in the transition to moder-
nity in the sixteenth century. It is to these fragments that I 
now turn. The argument of this article is very simple. I 
suggest that, parallel to the coming into being of Protes-
tant modes of subject formation and subjects, early mod-
ern Europe witnessed the development and proliferation 
of Catholic techniques of introspection and individuation. 
These practices, just like Protestant techniques, cultivated 
new recognition of guilt and shame, and new means of 
internalizing a new cognitive sense of who-am-I-ness. I 
will also suggest that these changes took place within the 
setting of thinking about, writing on, and undertaking 
confession. 
ThE MEDiEvAl CONfESSiNg SUbjECT
What does the transition to modern subjecthood look 
like from the Catholic perspective, using Delumeau’s and 
Bossy’s detailed histories of penance and Foucault’s theo-
rizing of the role of truth-telling in both subject-formation 
and subjugation? We should first point out that, unlike the 
Weberian paradigm, this transition to modern introspec-
tive subjecthood was a very slow but steady process of 
interiorization of the recognition of guilt and the cultiva-
tion of a sense of contrition that had started at least four 
hundred years prior to the Protestant Reformation. Insti-
tutionally, the most important moment of transition in the 
history of confession and the sacrament of penance was 
the requirement, put forward by the Fourth Lateran 
Church Council of 1215, that all Christians attend confes-
sion on a yearly basis and confess the sins they commit-
ted since their last confession (Lea 1896; rep. 1968; Béri-
ou 1983: Biller 1998).  Theologically, as good a place as 
any other to start is maybe the Cistercian abbot Bernard 
of Clairvaux (1090-1153). Recalling his own spiritual 
growth, St. Bernard praised the discretion and honesty of 
a monk named Humbert who had served as his spiritual 
director. “I had so often the opportunity of placing my 
head on his breast. But I am not the only one who knew 
him in this way . . . who is there who . . . did not learn the 
sources and remedy from his mouth? He knew so well to 
penetrate into the corners of a sick conscience that he 
who went to confess to him might have believed that he 
had seen everything, been present at everything.” (Clair-
vaux, 1957-1977). In a point that is germane to my argu-
ment, here (and elsewhere) Bernard uses the term confes-
sio to indicate not sacramental confession but rather 
spiritual colloquy.  Whereas in the past it had been possi-
ble to separate the care of souls and the cultivation of in-
trospection and conversion from confession, St. Bernard 
experienced a new version of this ancient monastic prac-
tice.
In the isolated monasteries of the Eastern Mediterra-
nean and Egypt and then in the wilderness of Europe, 
where the Christian practice of directing souls had been 
shaped, the cure of souls was taking place within an inti-
mate setting that involved a personal engagement of the 
director with the hidden secrets of the practitioner’s heart. 
Spiritual direction was a voluntary endeavor, and the ad-
visee, who sought the director’s advice, determined the 
content of the discussion. It was recommended to open 
one’s soul to the director as one might open a book for 
him to read, but it was never a requirement. The director, 
in turn, was to offer advice based on the commonality of 
all sinners, as well as on the unique experiences described 
to him by the individual advisee. The goal of confession 
is salvation, whereas direction of souls is characterized 
by advice and psychagogy, namely the formation of the 
soul. Prior to the thirteenth century, confession, lest we 
forget, had been conducted usually in public and was a 
communal event. And once it became mandatory in na-
ture, it entailed complete exposure on the part of the con-
fessant and complete amnesia on the part of the confes-
sor. The director of souls, for his part, exerted a moral, 
pedagogical, and charismatic – but never legal or sacra-
mental -- authority over the advisee.  In stark contrast to 
the confessional experience, the director was expected to 
remember the content of previous contacts with the advi-
see, as each exchange was presumed to be only a single 
encounter in an on-going spiritual engagement. And 
while confession dealt with the past, spiritual direction 
often dealt with the topography and movements of the 
soul in the present and with the means of acquiring 
self-knowledge and self-mastery and of becoming a bet-
ter Christians in the future. 
Important as they are, such theological, pastoral, and 
psychological distinctions between the art of confessing 
souls and the art of spiritual directing should not be over-
estimated. From the twelfth century on, due to St. Ber-
nard (and others), we see them eroding. In fact, both con-
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fessor and spiritual director were likened from this time 
on to ‘physicians of the soul,’ a comparison and a term 
that went back at least to the earliest Dominican Constitu-
tion (1220). The Florentine Dominican preacher Giovan-
ni Dominici (1356-1419) used this image in his Regola 
del governo di cura familiare, and his student, the moral 
theologian and archbishop of Florence Antonino of Flor-
ence (1389-1459) employed it later in his popular guide 
for confessors Summa Confessionalis, Curam illios habes 
of 1472 (Dominici, 1860; Pierozzi, 1481; see also Seneca 
1928-35).  For Antonino, only such correction can ensure 
the full benefits of the sacrament of confession. The im-
age then made its way into the Roman Ritual of 1614, and 
by the seventeenth century, the comparison of the confes-
sor to a physician of the soul is ubiquitous (De Boer 2001: 
53-63; Malgarini and Turrini 2004: 210-20). Jean Gerson 
(1363-1429) was another authority who conflated the dis-
tinction between the direction of souls and sacramental 
confession.  Echoing the fourth-century Gregory of Nys-
sa, Gerson said that “the art of arts is the direction of 
souls.” For him, it was obvious that direction occurred 
during the hearing of confessions (Gerson, 1998).
For Bernard and Gerson, then, and following them, to 
many theologians, confessors, and superiors, confession 
forgives the past but also shapes the future. Contrition 
called for a personal admission and recognition of guilt. 
Dominican philosopher Cardinal Thomas Cajetan (1469-
1534) referred to this stage as the actus veritatis, the 
avowal, the prerequisite that makes penance and thence 
conversion possible. Cajetan here captures well the new 
emphasis on recognition of oneself as a sinner, regardless 
of one’s actions in the world (Cajetan, 1530; see also 
Foucault, 2012b: 78-82).
This new amalgamation had an immense impact on the 
scholastic pastoral theology of the following centuries. 
Traditionally, Cura animarum had been one of the major 
responsibilities of superiors in monastic communities. The 
practice remained a form of sporadic spiritual advice rath-
er than a continuous relation with a follower, and the ad-
vice was only rarely tailored to the trainee (Tilatti, 1996). 
But in the later Middle Ages it was slowly becoming part 
and parcel of the practice of confession. In the sacrament 
of penance, the role of the penitential obligation (satisfac-
tio) decreased, while contrition (contritio in corde) and 
repentance became the more significant aspects of the sac-
rament. Interestingly, this interiorization of the sense of 
sin went hand in hand with an exteriorization of guilt: the 
confessant was to repent internally, to confess verbally to 
a confessor, and to manifest sincere contrition, but also to 
perform visual acts of satisfaction (Tentler, 1977; Hahn, 
1982). This complex process, analyzed by Delumeau and 
Bossy, contributed to an entire cottage industry of studies 
of confession and its impact in late medieval and early 
modern Catholicism. Suffice it to mention the important 
contributions of Thomas Tentler (1977), Prosperi (1996), 
Myers (1996), Romeo (1997), Vincenzo Lavenia (2004), 
de Boer (2001) and O’Banion (2012). 
The conflation into one of the roles of confessor and 
spiritual director contributed to a number of cognitive and 
affective changes. Confession now became a mechanism 
for a systematic interiorization of a sense of wrong-doing, 
accompanied by a cultivation and recognition of a sense 
of guilt. At the same time, confession, a traditional part of 
the sacrament of penance, was now also serving as a set-
ting that helped its practitioners to acquire a deeper un-
derstanding of their sinful essence, namely their internal 
selves as sinning selves. At the same time, the setting of 
the sacramental confession was used now as an opportu-
nity for the confessant to acquire knowledge in how to set 
life goals. As such, the early modern confession was a 
practice that joined past (sins) and future (goals) into a 
coherent self, a self that is being formed through the dia-
logical relation with the confessor that is taking place in 
the present. It was this process, namely confession as the 
process of making sense of one’s entire life--past, present, 
and future--that Michel Foucault had in mind when, in 
1981 or ‘82, he coined the term subjectivization (subjecti-
vation).
ThE jESUiT MODE Of SUbjECTivizATiON
Foucault’s genealogies of the power of confession to 
elicit new notions of knowledge and thence new forms of 
discipline and self-discipline, as well as the relations of 
power to subject-formation, truth-telling, and historical 
change hovered above his entire work (Chevallier, 2011; 
Taylor, 2009). And yet, he never wrote much about early 
modern Catholicism. His discussions of “The Classical 
Age”--the French term for early modernity, of the new 
fields of knowledge and power that were created in the 
seventeenth century, and of René Descartes and Absolut-
ism never refer to the Council of Trent, for example, or 
to the Society of Jesus. This is the case even though al-
most all of the literary references he supplied for his dis-
cussion of Christian practices and theological discussion 
that document events and processes beyond the Church 
Fathers refer repeatedly and almost solely not to medie-
val theological and pastoral texts but to early modern 
manuals (Foucault, 2003; 2007). This lacuna (and the 
reasons for it) notwithstanding, I want to reconstruct in 
the following paragraphs the French philosopher’s argu-
ment about the role of confession in the creating of mod-
ern subjectivities. 
By means of confession, Foucault argued, “everyone 
in Christianity had to explore who he is, what is happen-
ing within himself, the faults he might have committed or 
may commit, and the temptations to which he is exposed. 
Moreover, everyone is obliged to tell these things to other 
people, and hence bear witness against himself,” he stated 
(Foucault, 1999: 182-3). For Foucault, then, confession 
was first and foremost a cognitive-psychological “ritual 
of discourse where the subject who speaks corresponds 
with the subject of the statement.” During confession, the 
confessing person acquires the modern notion of selfhood 
as a quest for, and belief in a pre-existing internal truth. 
Confessing is a mode of self-formation as a subject, a 
subject who has an essence, an internal truth that defines 
it. The dynamics of confession, however, are never an ex-
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ercise in self-formation by introspecting and truth-telling 
to the inquiring self itself. They are also always dialogic: 
one confesses to another person or entity. As such, the 
production of truth about one’s self, which is also the pro-
duction of the self, is also always already the production 
of the subject as subjugated to the authority of the listen-
er. Confession produces not only subjects but also subju-
gation to authority and to the government of the self by 
itself. 
While this process of self-formation by means of 
truth-telling had been a major part of Christianity from its 
inception, in a lecture at the Collège de France on March 
17, 1982, Foucault explained that Cassian’s exercises of 
self-knowledge “will live throughout Christianity and re-
appear with new, greater dimensions and a new, stronger 
intensity in the sixteenth century, and especially in the 
Counter Reformation.” (Foucault, 2004: 422; cf. 309). 
Similarly, describing the practice of spiritual exercises 
that train individuals in scrutinizing themselves in order 
to find faults and develop guilt, Foucault elaborated that 
“it is striking how important it was in the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth centuries for Christianity to define each exer-
cise in its specificity, to prescribe the ordering of these 
exercises in relation to each other and their temporal suc-
cession according to the day, week, month, year, and also 
of the individual’s progress.” And he went on: 
“At the end of the sixteenth century a truly pious per-
son’s life – and I am not even talking about members of 
seminaries or monks; I am talking about the entire Catho-
lic world – was literally carpeted and lined with exercis-
es, which had to be kept up and practiced daily and hour-
ly, according to times of the day, circumstances, moments 
of life, and degree of advancement in spiritual exercises. 
There were entire manuals explaining all the exercises 
you had to do at each of these moments; there was no 
moment of life that did not have to be doubled, prompted, 
and underpinned by a certain type of exercise” (Foucault, 
2004: 423).
Foucault was referring, of course, to Ignatius of 
Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises and to the many renditions 
and variations of this foundational text (Loyola, 1992). 
And while they are never named explicitly, Foucault could 
not but have had them in mind. Spiritual exercises usually 
led to confession of sins. In Loyola’s celebrated collection, 
too, the goal of the first week of exercises is a recognition 
of guilt, an enhanced sense of contrition, and a general con-
fession, the latter being a precondition to advancing spiri-
tually and gaining consolation (Sluhovsky, 2013) 
Whatever the reasons for his omission of Loyola’s 
name, Foucault was right that early modern Christian 
spiritual exercises conflated confession, spiritual direc-
tion, and spiritual growth. They required the trainer in 
spiritual exercises to guide the practitioner into recogni-
tion of “the truth about himself. It is, I think, an absolute-
ly crucial moment in the history of subjectivity in the 
West, or in the relations between subjectivity and truth, 
when the task of obligation of truth-telling about oneself 
is inserted within the procedure indispensable for salva-
tion, within techniques of the development and transfor-
mation of the subject by himself, and within pastoral in-
stitutions” (Foucault, 2005: 364). For Foucault, then, the 
end result of spiritual exercises was subjectivization. This 
was a process of a subjectivization into a subjecthood that 
had unique characteristics. First and foremost, it always 
identified the self with guilt and shame. It always created 
both the modern self and the self-rejection or abjection of 
this modern self. We are modern, one could say, in as far 
as we are culpable and insofar as we overcome our bodies 
and ourselves.
Using Foucault’s theorization of the process of sub-
jectivization is helpful, I suggest, to recalibrating the pro-
cess of the consolidation a mechanism of control put for-
ward by the Confessionalization Theory. The political/
pastoral amalgamation of powers and truth, operated by 
interiorization of guilt and by confessing, characterized 
modern Christian culture in both Protestant and Catholic 
avatars. This was partly due to the fact that it was only 
since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that Police 
and Government (both in the wider, French early-modern 
sense of the terms) became the general order of European 
powers. The practice of confession as means of self-for-
mation took slightly different shapes in the rival religious 
cultures. Catholics, as we have seen, could only reach 
their subjectivization through confession to a director of 
souls, who often serves also as a confessor, while Protes-
tants could often confess to their diaries (and thus become 
their own directors of souls once they leafed through and 
reread their own confessions). Be the religious context 
what it may, from the dawn of modernity, modern selves 
have been monitored not only by external apparatuses of 
information-gathering that possessed means to examine, 
analyze, and control the subjects. Foucault, in fact, added 
what was missing from the Confessionalization Theory: 
the new control mechanisms operated also—and, in fact, 
more importantly--within the self itself. Early modern 
confessional practices were guilt-producing mechanisms 
that functioned, as the Confessionalization Paradigm ar-
gues, in the service of the disciplinary regimes of state 
and church (Foucault, 1978). Their practitioners internal-
ized guilt and submission to authority and by so doing 
were made into docile citizens. Equally important, I sug-
gest, is that by means of confession, the modern self 
comes to recognize himself or herself as the holder of a 
truth about the self. In modernity, confession to self, to a 
priest, and later on to the policeman, the physician, or the 
psychoanalyst have all become disciplinary mechanisms 
that produce a new form of subjecthood, a personal and 
political order in which one no longer merely submits to 
authority but becomes “the authority who requires the 
confession” (Foucault, 1978: 61; 2003: 167-99;  2012)
The manufacturing of a truth about the self is surely 
both the main goal and the actual process of confessional 
practices. Foucault was right to insist on the centrality 
and persistence, in Western thought, of the Augustinian 
dictum that “by making truth inside oneself, one could 
get access to the light” (qui facit veritatem venit ad lu-
cem) (quoted in Foucault, 1997: 202). “I have a very 
strong Christian, Catholic background, and I am not 
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ashamed of it,” Foucault declared in a roundtable discus-
sion in 1983. And in a conversation a few years earlier, 
when provoked by a young hitchhiker who argued that 
what is left of the church today is nothing but simulacrum 
and that there are “not many people left who take an in-
terest in all that,” Foucault laughed and agreed: “there is 
only me left.”1 This Christian sensibility might have been 
what enabled him to see both sides of the dyadic relation 
between the confessant and the confessor. The confessant 
was, obviously, subjugating himself or herself to the au-
thority of the spiritual director/confessor. But the confes-
sor was only a vehicle for sacramental grace, and as such 
the dynamic was taking place not between the practitioner 
and the confessor but between the practitioner and God. It 
was God, not a human agent of this-worldly authorities, 
such as the ecclesiastical church or the secular state, that 
lay at the core of Christian ontology and practices of con-
fession. God was the light at the end of the tunnel, the 
goal that was worth striving for and that justified in the 
eyes of believers the effort, the shame and guilt, and the 
submission to clerical authority. This light, what Augus-
tine called the “truth that dwells in the inward man” (In 
interiore homine habitat veritas), however, was, at the 
end of the day, not the practitioner’s true inner self but the 
re-meeting of the self with the image of God within.2 
SUMMArY
Modernity and subjectivization came to the world 
joined like Siamese twins. The co-existence of the oppos-
ing tendencies toward freedom and discipline and the 
process of increased individualization by submission to 
growing mechanisms of self-control are at the very core 
of the transition of modern subjecthood. These ambiva-
lences, that have been theorized by Weber, Giddens, Wag-
ner, Sloterdijk, and, above all, Foucault, have shaped nu-
merous domains of social and psychological life of 
modern subjects. The Catholic sacrament of confession, I 
argue, was a practice whose centrality to the Catholic 
sense of who-am-I-ness was crucial for the stylization of 
the modern Catholic subject way beyond the sphere of re-
ligious practices and beliefs. Confession was, indeed, as 
Foucault has convincingly theorized, a process of self-for-
mation by means of introspection, narration, and verbal-
ization, and subjugation to authority (both external and 
internal) was an integral part of it. But at its theological 
core, confession entailed not only disciplinary submis-
sion but also liberation. The hermeneutics of the self were 
a restructuring of one’s subjectivity by substituting one 
form of control for another: submission to God was liber-
ation from control of Satan. Foucault taught us that there 
is no human setting immune to power. Confession, too, 
was surely not a release from power relations into a realm 
of (imaginary and non-existent) freedom. But within the 
Christian onto-theology from whence it sprang, shifting 
from being subjected to Satan to being subjugated to God 
was conceptualized as liberation. In one of the few sur-
viving fragments from the never-published fourth volume 
of his History of Sexuality Foucault, in fact, recognized 
this point. Elaborating on the connection between the act 
of verbalization of confession to another human being 
and the ability to enhance one’s relations with the divine, 
Foucault explained: “One has to rid oneself of the power 
of the Other, the Enemy, who hides behind seeming like-
nesses of oneself, and eternal warfare has to be waged 
against this Other, which one cannot win without the help 
of the Almighty, who is mightier than he. Confession to 
others, submission to their advice and permanent obedi-
ence to one’s superiors are essential in this battle” (Fou-
cault, 1999:196).
NOTES
1 Foucault’s archives, Document D250(7); Conversation with P. 
Rabinow, B. Dreyfus et al., Berkeley, April 21, 1983; quoted in 
(Bernauer, 2004: 97). Foucault, “On Religion (1978)”, in (Carret-
te, 1999: 109).
2 Augustine, De vera religione 39.72; and see the discussion in 
(Taylor, 1989: 127-42 and Schuld, 2003). 
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